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Shuttle Mission STS-58 was launched at 10:53 am local 10/18/93
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1.0 Summary
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 13 October 1993. The detailed walkdown of
Launch Pad 39B and MLP-I also included the primary flight
elements OV-102 Columbia (15th flight), ET-57 (LWT 50), and
BI-061 SRB's. There were no significant facility or vehicle
anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded on 14 October 1993. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside of the
established data base. One IPR was taken against two cracks on
the -Y ET/SRB cable tray forward surface TPS. The condition was
assessed and found acceptable for flight.
The launch was scrubbed at T-31 seconds and holding due to the
loss of an Air Force range safety ground computer. A post drain
inspection of the vehicle revealed no significant anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded a second time on 15 October 1993.
There were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303
criteria violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside
of the established data base and no IPR's were taken.
The launch was scrubbed during the T-9 minute hold due to an
Orbiter S-band transponder failure. A post drain inspection of
the vehicle revealed no anomalies.
The vehicle was cryoloaded a third time on 18 October 1993.
There were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303
criteria violations. There were no ice/frost conditions outside
of the established data base and no IPR's were taken.
After the 10:53 a.m. launch on 18 October 1993, a debris walk
down of Pad 39B was performed. No flight hardware or TPS
materials were found. There was no visual indication of a stud
hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. Two debris
particles fell out of a cavity in the HDP #3 doghouse blast
cover during liftoff. Damage to the facility and pad overall
was minimal.
An IPR was taken on the GH2 vent line based on film review
findings that the line moved approximately 6 inches back toward
the vehicle before latching. Post launch troubleshooting showed
the latch spring tension was within specification, but at the
low end of the limit. The spring tension will be adjusted
prior to the next launch. The deceleration shock absorber load
cell data was reviewed and showed nominal performance.
A total of 117 films and videos were analyzed as part of the
post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost flight
hardware was observed that would have affected the mission.
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One Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket MR patch
(covering) was missing from the SSME #3 9:00 o'clock position
(IFA STS58-V-0009) and was most likely the white object
observed in the film review falling aft of the vehicle at 45
seconds MET. The underlying batting material was torn/frayed.
The DMHS MR patch on SSME #2 3:00 o'clock position was detached
on three sides.
The DMHS closeout blanket/MR patch protects the SSME support
structure, inner flexseal, and pressure seal. The DMHS blanket
MR patches on 0V-102 and OV-104 are an old design consisting of
"S" Glass material tack-stitched on 3-inch centers. Fraying and
ripping of the patches in flight is common. Standard repair
procedures are performed on a PR. A new design with AB312
(Nextel) material uses continuous stitching through the blanket
on a 1-inch grid pattern. The new material is thicker, has a
higher temperature resistance, is more durable, and is
currently installed on 0V-103 and OV-105. Until the new design
blanket can be installed on OV-102 and OV-104, the current
blanket repair procedure will be reviewed and the condition of
any repaired blankets will be evaluated.
Orbiter post landing microchemical sample results revealed a
variety of residuals in the Orbiter window samples from the
window protective covers, SRB BSM exhaust, Orbiter TPS, RCS
thruster paper covers, and paints/primers from various sources.
Blue paint particulate with zinc alloy on one side was added as
a new finding. The source of this material has not yet been
determined. These residual sampling data do not indicate a
single source of damaging debris as all of the other materials
have previously been documented in post-landing sample reports.
The residual sample data showed no debris trends when compared
to previous mission data.
A total of II Post Launch Anomalies, including four In-Flight
Anomaly, were observed during the STS-58 mission assessment.
3.0 SCRUB - RANGESAFETY COMPUTER
The first launch attempt of STS-58 was scrubbed at T-31 seconds
and holding due to the loss of an Air Force range safety (SRO)
redundant ground computer.
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle
was conducted on 13 October 1993 from 0915-1015 hours. The
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and MLP-I also included the
primary flight elements OV-102 Columbia (15th flight), ET-57
(LWT 50), and BI-061 SRB's. There were no significant debris
issues or vehicle anomalies.
3.2 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 14 October 1993 from 0425 to 0720 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. One IPR was taken against a two crack condition on
the -Y ET/SRB cable tray forward surface TPS. Ambient weather
conditions at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
72.6 Degrees F
89.3 Percent
4 Knots
274 Degrees
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to obtain
vehicle surface temperature measurements (ref Figures 1 and 2)
for a thermal assessment of the vehicle
3.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter RCC panel or TPS anomalies were observed. All RCS
thruster paper covers were intact. Typical ice and frost
accumulations were present at the SSME heat shield-to-nozzle
interfaces. The base heat shield tiles were dry. An infrared
scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the base heat
shield or engine mounted heat shields.
3.4 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH SRB case
temperatures of 71-72 degrees F. In comparison, temperatures
measured by a hand-held Minolta/Land Cyclops spot radiometer
ranged from 72 to 75 degrees F and the SRB Ground Environment
Instrumentation (GEI) measured temperatures of 76-77 degrees F.
All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum
requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature
(PMBT) supplied by MTI was 79 degrees F, which was within the
required range of 44-86 degrees F.
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3.6 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and
properly configured for launch (LCC requirement). There was no
debris on the MLP deck or in the SRB holddown post areas.
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0
umbilicals, the GH2 vent line, or the GUCP.
3.7 POST DRAIN VEHICLE INSPECTION
The tumble valve cover on the External Tank was intact. No
defects were noted on the nosecone TPS.
No anomalies (divots or cracks) were observed on the L02 tank,
intertank, or LH2 tank acreage.
Ice remained in the L02 feedline support brackets, but no loose
foam or TPS damage was visible.
Bipod jack pad closeouts were intact and flush with adjacent
LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout foam.
One of the two cracks in the -Y ET/SRB vertical strut cable
tray forward surface TPS (reported during the Ice Team Inspec-
tion) was still visible.
Some froth was present on the aft dome +Z manhole cover BX-250
closeout.
No anomalies were observed on the Orbiter,
Boosters, or MLP deck.
Solid Rocket
No significant vehicle damage was discovered as a result of the
post drain inspection.
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Pre-launch configuration of ET intertank and GUCP
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Pre-launch configuration of bipod jack pad closeouts
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Stream of liquid (water) from L02 feedline elbow was caused by
condensate run-off. Ice/frost finger of the umbilical aft pyro
can closeout was typical.
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Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB
umbilical outboard side, aft plate gap purge vent, aft pyro can
purge vent, and cable tray drain hole. No unusual vapors or
cryogenic drips appeared during tanking and stable replenish.
16
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4.0 SCRUB - ORBITERS-BAND TRANSPONDER
The second launch attempt of STS-58 was scrubbed during the T-9
minute hold due to an Orbiter S-Band Transponder #2 anomaly.
4.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the SSV and MLP deck was not
performed due to the 24 hour scrub-turnaround.
4.2 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 15 October 1993 from 0540 to 0710 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, 0MRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established
data base and no IPR's were taken. Ambient weather conditions
at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
76.0 Degrees F
84.7 Percent
4.1 Knots
146 Degrees
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
as shown in Figures 4 and 5.
4.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter RCC panel or TPS anomalies were observed. The F2U
and F4D RCS thruster paper covers had been wetted by internal
vapors. Typical ice/frost accumulated at the SSME heat shield-
to-nozzle interfaces. Some frost was present on the SSME #i
drain line. The SSME engine mounted heat shields were wet from
condensate. An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature
gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat
shields.
4.4 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH SRB case
temperatures of 75-78 degrees F. In comparison, temperatures
measured by a hand-held Minolta/Land Cyclops spot radiometer
averaged 78 degrees F and the SRB Ground Environment Instrumen-
tation (GEI) measured temperatures of 79 degrees F. All
measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum
requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature
(PMBT) supplied by MTI was 79 degrees F, which was within the
required range of 44-86 degrees F.
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FIGURE5. SSV INFRARED SCANNER
SURFACE TEMPERATURE
SUMMARY DATA
TIME: Nr_N-N71N
DATE: 10/15/93
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The F2U and F4D RCS thruster paper covers had been wetted
by internal vapors.
23
CO_..(;:,. - '- " ......
5.0 LAUNCH
STS-58 was launched at 93:291:14:53:10.009 GMT (10:53 am local)
on 18 October 1993.
5.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch SSV/pad debris inspection was performed from 0900
to i000 hours on 17 October 1993. No anomalies on the facility
or the flight hardware were detected.
5.2 ICE/FROST INSPECTION
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was
performed on 18 October 1993 from 0525 to 0655 hours during the
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria
violations. There were no conditions outside of the established
data base and no IPR's were taken. Ambient weather conditions
at the time of the inspection were:
Temperature:
Relative Humidity:
Wind Speed:
Wind Direction:
71.2 Degrees F
95.0 Percent
6.7 Knots
295 Degrees
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning
radiometer was utilized to obtain vehicle surface temperature
measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
as shown in Figures 7 and 8.
5.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS
thruster paper covers, including the wet cover on the R4D
nozzle, were intact. Typical ice and frost accumulations were
present at the SSME #i and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces.
Some frost was present on the SSME #i and #3 drain lines. An
infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the
base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields.
5.4 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the PSTI averaged 70-74
degrees F; the spot radiometer ranged from 72 to 74 degrees F;
and the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEI) measured
temperatures at 75 degrees F. All measured temperatures were
above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. The predicted
Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied by MTI was 79
degrees F, which was within the required range of 44-86 degrees
Fahrenheit.
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FIGURE 8. SSV INFRARED SCANNER
SURFACE TEMPERATURE
SUMMARY DATA
TIME: 0535-0655
DATE: 10/18/93
VEH.STS- 58
All temperatures in°F
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Typical ice and frost accumulations were present on the SSME #i
and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces and on the SSME #i and
#3 drain lines.
3O
Pre-launch configuration of the intertank and GUCP after cryo
load. Ice formation on the GUCP legs and uninsulated areas was
typical. No unusual vapors were present around the GUCP.
31
Ice/frost with venting vapors appeared at the aft outboard
corner of the +Y bipod spindle housing closeout. There were no
anomalies visible on the bipod jack pad closeouts. Ice/frost in
the L02 feedline upper bellows was typical.
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Ice/frost had formed on the pressurization line support
closeout aft edges-to-acreage bondlines and cable tray ramp aft
edges
33
Typical amounts of ice/frost had formed in the L02 feedline
bellows and support brackets
34
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the ET/ORB LH2
umbilical. Ice/frost on the plate gap and pyro can purge vents,
cable tray drain hole, LH2 recirculation line bellows and burst
discs was also typical. No cryogenic drips or unusual vapors
appeared during tanking and stable replenish.
35
6.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS, and RSS was
conducted on 18 October 1993 from Launch + 1 to 2.5 hours.
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found.
South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP EPON shoe shim
material was intact though some of the HDP #5 and #6 sidewall
material was debonded. There was no visual indication of a stud
hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. The SRB T-0 umbili-
cals exhibited typical damage with several connector savers
protruding above the interface plane.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA), and GOX
vent arm showed only minor damage. The GH2 vent line was
latched on the second of eight teeth of the latching mechanism
and had no loose cables (static retract lanyard). The GH2 vent
line showed typical signs of SRB plume impingement.
An IPR was taken on the GH2 vent line based on film review
findings that the line moved approximately 6 inches back toward
the vehicle before latching. Post launch troubleshooting showed
the latch spring tension was within specification, but at the
low end of the limit. The spring tension will be adjusted
prior to the next launch. The deceleration shock absorber load
cell data was reviewed and showed nominal performance.
Typical damage to the facility included:
i. OTV camera 156 (located on north side of the MLP deck)
sustained a broken purge tube.
2. A cable tray elbow cover was detached on the RSS 207
foot level.
3. 2 large pieces of masonry lay in the SSME flame trench.
4. Sheet metal, 36" x 24" in size, was found on the pad
apron near the southwest MLP pedestal.
5. A piece of black foam rubber, 48" x 18" x 0.5" in size,
lay on the platform near the GH2 vent line latch.
Post launch inspections on 19 October 1993 included a walkdown
of the pad acreage, north flame trench and beach, and a
helicopter overflight of the pad/water areas. No flight
hardware or TPS material was found.
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section Ii.
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South SRB HDP eros±on was typical. All south HDP EPON shim
material was intact. There were no stud hang-ups on any of the
holddown posts.
37
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The GH2 vent line was latched on.the second of eight teeth of
the latching mechanism. Normally the line latches on the 6th or
7th tooth. An IPR was taken based on film review findings that
the line moved approximately 6 inches before reaching the final
latch position.
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7.0 FILM REVIEWAND PROBLEM REPORTS
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the
Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems
engineers. Three In-Flight Anomalies and one IPR were generated
as a result of the film review. Post flight anomalies are
listed in Section Ii.
7.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMKARY
A total of i01 films and videos, which included forty-one 16mm
films, twenty 35mm films, four 70mm films, and thirty-six
videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have affected the mission.
SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile
appeared normal (C/S-2 STI, OTV 151, 163, 170, 171).
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the
centerline area between the SSME cluster occurred during engine
start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous
launches (E-76, 77).
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice to fall from the
ET/Orbiter umbilicals. At least five pieces of ice contacted
the umbilical cavity sill and were deflected outward, but no
tile damage was visible (OTV 109) . One white object, most
likely ice from the L02 feedline fell aft from a position
forward of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical (0TV 163).
There were no unusual vapors or cryogenic drips from the ET/ORB
umbilicals during tanking, stable replenish, ignition, liftoff,
and tower clear (OTV 109, 150, 154, 163, 164).
Six pieces of ice fell from the LO2 feedline upper bellows, but
did not contact Orbiter tiles. Two dark particles, one forward
of the bipods and the second appearing in an area between the
intertank and the feedline bellows, also did not contact the
vehicle (E-65 frame 1200).
A black particle, most likely facility debris, first appeared
forward of the Orbiter and fell aft along the -Y side of the
vehicle prior to T-0 (E-34, frame 2510; E-35, frame 1859). This
may be the same particle entering the field of view and passing
near the outboard elevon (E-31) . A second thin, white particle,
entered the field of view forward of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical
and fell aft after T-0 (E-31, frame 1202).
Deflection of the External Tank nosecone during SSME ignition
was approximately 33 inches (E-79) .
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Frustum separation from the forward skirts, parachute deploy-
ment appeared normal. One parachute was late in opening but
reached full reef position before nozzle severance (E-301) .
Water splashdown was not visible (E-301, 302).
41
Two small silhouetted objects between the Orbiter and the LH2
T-0 umbilical carrier plate shortly after liftoff appear to be
pieces of aft RCS thruster paper covers (arrows) .
42
Two debris particles fell out of a cavity in the
HDP #3 doghouse blast cover during liftoff (arrows)
43
No stud hang-ups occurred. Two ordnance fragments fell
from the HDP #2 DCS/stud hole shortly after liftoff.
44
Ice on the GUCP legs caused two pieces of intertank CPR foam
(i0" x 2" and 3" x 2") to pull loose from adjacent stringer
heads and expose primer/substrate.
45
A white object, believed to be a Dome Mounted Heat Shield
closeout blanket MR patch, fell aft of the vehicle 45 seconds
MET. The object originated between SSME #2 and #3, got caught
in plume recirculation near the base heat shield, and passed
the exit plane of SSME #I before falling away from the vehicle.
46
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7.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
DTO-0312 was performed by the flight crew. Thirty-eight hand
held still images were obtained of the ET after separation from
the Orbiter. OV-102 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras:
16mm motion picture with 5 mm lens; 16mm motion picture with
10mm lens; sixty 35mm still views. Data was obtained from all
three films.
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed
that would have been a safety of flight concern.
CPR foam, 28 inches long by 3 inches wide, was missing from an
intertank stringer head forward of the bipods and aft of the +Z
aero vent (XT-990) . At least 18 inches of primed substrate was
exposed. The loss of this foam may have contributed to the
tile damage along the Orbiter lower surface centerline (IFA
STS-58-T-I) . The divot appears to be a different type than the
spray gun "rollover" induced divots observed on previous
vehicles. An investigation team confirmed all acceptance
requirements were met and there were no processing anomalies.
The team is currently reviewing certification history, material
processing development, and requirements.
One divot, 12 inches long by 8 inches wide, occurred in the LH2
tank-to-intertank flange closeout in the -Y+Z quadrant between
the -Y bipod and the thrust panel. A second divot, 4-6 inches
in diameter, occurred in the +Y+Z quadrant flange closeout.
Both bipod jack pad closeouts were missing. Primer was visible
in 25 percent of the +Y jack pad cavity and 50 percent of the
-Y jack pad cavity (IFA STS-58-T-I) . The loss of this foam may
have contributed to the centerline tile damage on the Orbiter
lower surface. A rough-edged object drifting aft along the +Z
side of the tank was light colored on one side (new foam) and
dark on the other side (rind or topcoat). This object may have
been a piece of ET foam.
Historically, jack pad closeouts have lost material during
ascent on numerous flights. Corrective actions already
implemented include expanding the cleaning and priming require-
ments, beveling the forward edge of the cavity to reduce
entrapped air/voids, performing a two step closeout (filling
the insert holes with PDL), and specialized training techniques
to minimize process anomalies. An investigation team confirmed
there were no processing anomalies and that all acceptance
requirements were met. The team is currently reviewing material
processing development, the certification history, and all
requirements.
Three divots, 3-5 inches in diameter,
acreage TPS forward of the bipods.
occurred in intertank
47
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A 10-inch by 5-inch piece of foam,was missing from the outboard
surface of the -Y ET/SRB cable tray. The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical
appeared to be in good condition with the exception of foam
peeled back on the forward surface near the forward inboard
pyro can closeout. The red purge seal was intact.
5O
Frozen hydrogen adhered to a portion of the LH2 17-inch flapper
valve. A large chunk of frozen hydrogen from the remaining
flapper valve surface area drifted by the camera.
51
Foam on the forward surface of the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical was
peeled back (2 places). The lightning contact strip across the
forward section of the umbilical had detached completely and is
visible in this view just above the crossbeam.
52
Foam, 28" x 3", was missing from a stringer head aft of the +X
aero vent (XT-990) . At least 18 inches of primed substrate was
exposed. Portions of both bipod jack pad closeouts were missing
revealing primed substrate.
5
7.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO S_Y
A total of twelve 16mm landing films were reviewed.
Orbiter performance on final approach appeared normal. There
were no anomalies when the landing gear was extended. Touchdown
of the left and right main gear was nominal and virtually
simultaneous.
The drag chute was deployed after breakover, but before the
nose gear contacted the runway. Drag chute deployment appeared
nominal. The drag chute door and sabot cover appeared to get
caught in an aerodynamic vortex and made a harder-than-usual
impact with the runway.
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth.
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%The RH frustum was missing no TPS, but had 20 MSA-2
over fasteners. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint
in localized areas.
debonds
occurred
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Three BSM aero heatshield covers were locked in the fully
opened position. The lower left cover was missing. Note
bent/fractured cover attach ring at nozzle exit plane.
59
Post flight assessment determined the cover was lost during
re-entry/water impact. BSM covers have been lost on eight
previous flights.
6O
The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS
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The HDP #3 DCS plunger was obstructed by a frangible nut web,
firing cable, and NSI cartridge. Post flight disassembly of the
DCS container revealed a 78% retention of ordnance fragments.
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8.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The LH frustum was missing no TPS, but had 34 MSA-2 debonds
over fasteners (Figure 12). Minor blistering of the Hypalon
paint had occurred in localized areas. The BSM aero heat shield
covers were locked in the fully opened position.
The LH forward skirt acreage exhibited no debonds or missing
TPS. Both RSS antennae covers/phenolic base plates were intact.
Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred near the ET/SRB
attach point and on the systems tunnel cover.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good
condition.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB
aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers appeared undamaged.
The phenolic material on the kick ring was delaminated. The aft
skirt acreage MSA-2 TPS was generally in good condition. No
significant amount of BTA was used on this aft skirt.
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated
and appeared to have functioned properly. A post retrieval
disassembly of the HDP #5 and #6 DCS containers revealed a
retention of 99% and 94%, respectively. No EPON shim material
was lost during flight.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section ii.
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The LH frustum was missing no TPS, but had a total of 34 MSA-2
debonds over fasteners. The BSM aero heatshield covers were
locked in the fully opened position.
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!The LH forward skirt acreage MSA-2 exhibited no debonds or
missing TPS. Both RSS antenna covers/phenolic base plates were
intact.
67
Post flight condition of the aft booster/aft skirt. Acreage
MSA-2 was generally in good condition. No significant amount of
BTA was used on this aft skirt.
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9.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing debris inspection of OV-102 (Columbia) was
conducted 1-2 November 1993 at the Ames-Dryden Flight Research
Center/Edwards Air Force Base on runway 22 and in the Mate/
Demate Device. This inspection was performed to identify debris
impact damage and, if possible, debris sources. The Orbiter TPS
sustained a total of 155 hits, of which 26 had a major dimen-
sion of one inch or greater. This total does not include the
numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME
vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A
comparison of these numbers to statistics from 42 previous
missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23,
25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known
debris sources), indicates that both the total number of hits
and the number of hits one inch or larger was greater than
average (reference Figures 13-16).
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 78 hits, of
which 23 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. The
appearance of 15 shallow tile damage sites greater than one
inch in size from the nose landing gear door to the ET/ORB
umbilicals along the Orbiter centerline indicates impacts from
low density objects, such as foam from the ET intertank.
The following table breaks down the STS-58 Orbiter debris
damage by area:
HITS > i" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface
Upper surface
Right side
Left side
Right OMS Pod
Left OMS Pod
23 78
2 43
1 19
0 3
0 3
0 9
TOTALS 26 155
Numerous hits in the vicinity of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical may
be indicative of impacts from higher density materials, such as
ice.
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels,
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires showed typical
wear from landing on a concrete runway. The LH MLG outboard
tire exhibited an undercut on the inner tread.
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-I, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned
properly. All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation ordnance reten-
tion shutters were closed properly. No flight hardware was
found on the runway below the ET/ORB umbilical cavities when
the ET doors were opened.
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FIGURE14. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
TOTAL HITS = 22
HITS > 1 INCH = 1
mA
FIGURE 16. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
5 HITS
0>1"
BODY FLAP
_X lX 1/2 c_--!PPROX. 5"
MAJOR DIMENSION
ee
16 HITS --
0 >1"
1 1/2 X 1/2 X 118
NOTE: (1) BODY FLAP UPPER SURFACE
IMPACTS NOT INCLUDED IN
TOTAL HITS COUNT.
(2) INCLUDES 6 HITS FROM
VERTICAL TAIL STINGER
DRAIN TILE
1 X 3/4 X 1/2 TOTAL HITS = 43 (1),(2)
HITS > 1 INCH : 2
ALL DIMENSIONS
IN INCHES
EGGNC.OBB¢
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FIGURE17. _T_-58 RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS AS
RECORDED BY THE SHUTTLE THERMAL IMAGER
RCC PANEL 1778
TIME 20 min after
landing
RCC PANEL9 88
TIME 20 minutes
after landing
ORBITER:
MISSION:
0V-102
STS-58
ALL MEASUREMENTS IN
DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
NOSECAP 170
TIME 20 min after landing
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FIGURE 18. ORBITER DEBRIS DAMAGE ASSESSMENT SUMMARY
LOWER SURFACE
Hijs____' TOE aL_HiTs
ENTIRE VEHICLE
HITS > I" TOTAL HITS
STS-6 15 80 36
STS-8 3 29 7
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14
STS-11 (41-B) 11 19 34
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8
SIS-14 (41-D) 10 44 30
STS-17 (41-G) 25 69 36
STS-19 (51-A) 14 _5 20
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28
STS-23 (51-D) 43* 111' 46*
STS-?4 (51-B) 45* 110' 63=
STS-25 (51-6) 109* 231* 144*
STS-26 (51-F) 179= 482* 226=
STS-27 (51-I) 21 96 33
STS-28 (51-3) 7 66 17
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34
STS-31 (61-8) 37 177 55
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39
STS-26R 47* 342* 55z
STS-27R 272* 644* 298*
SIS-29 _ 18 100 25
STS-3OR 52* 134= 56=
STS-28R 13 60 20
STS-34 17 51 18
STS-33R 21 107 21
STS-32R 13 111 15
STS-36 17 61 19
STS-31R 13 47 14
STS-41 13 64 16
STS-38 7 70 8
STS-35 15 132 17
SIS-37 7 91 10
STS-59 14 217 16
STS-40 23 153 25
STS-45 24 122 25
STS-48 14 100 25
STS-44 6 74 9
ST5-42 38* 159' 44*
STS-45 18 122 22
STS-49 6 55 II
SIS-50 28 141 45
STS-46 Ii 186 22
STS-47 3 48 11
STS-52 6 152 16
STS-53 11 145 23
STS-54 14 80 14
STS-56 18 94 36
STS-55 10 128 13
SIS-57 10 75 12
STS-51 8 IO0 18
AVERAGE 14.3 93.8 21.8
120
56
58
63
36
III
154
87
81
152=
140"
315'
553*
141
111
183
257
193
411*
707*
132
151'
76
53
118
120
81
63
76
81
147
113
238
197
131
182
101
209*
172
114
184
236
lOB
290
240
131
156
143
106
154
133.2
SIS-58 23 78 26 155
MISSIONS MARKED WITH (*) ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS SINCE THESE HIT TOTALS WERE BIASED BY DAMAGE FROM KNOWN
DEBRIS SOURCES. 77
United States
Overall view of Orbiter left side
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Overall view of base heat shield and SSME's. Tile damage on the
base heat shield was less than usual. Note damage to SSME #2
and #3 Dome Mounted Heat Shield closeout blankets.
8]
Overall view of Orbiter nose. Hazing on Orbiter forward facinq
windows was typical. Window #3 was hazed the most. Damage to
window perimeter tiles was less than usual.
82
The Orbiter lower surface tiles sustained a total of 78 hits,
of which 23 had a major dimension of 1-inch or larger
83
Damage to ET door edge tile
84
Close-in view of lower surface tile damage site shows effects
of re-entry heating (glazing, slumping, discoloration)
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Overall view of the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was
opened.
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation
ordnance devices functioned properly. No flight hardware was
found on the runway below the umbilical when the ET door was
opened.
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No significant amounts of ET foam or red purge seal adhered to
the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical plate near the LH2 4-inch line flapper
valve.
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Dome Mounted Heat Shield closeout blanket covering was missing
from the SSME #3 9:00 o'clock position and was most likely the
white object observed in the post launch film review falling
aft of the vehicle at 45 seconds MET.
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10.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS
A total of eight samples were obtained from OV-102 Columbia
during the STS-58 post landing debris assessment at Dryden
Flight Research Facility, California. The submitted samples
consisted of 8 wipes from Orbiter windows 1-8. The samples were
analyzed by the NASA KSC Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB)
for material composition and comparison to known STS materials.
Debris analysis involves both the placing and the correlating
of particles and residues with respect to composition, thermal
(mission) effects, and availability. Debris sample results/
analyses are listed by Orbiter location in the following
summaries.
ORBITER WINDOWS
Samples from the Orbiter windows indicated exposure to SRB BSM
exhaust (metallic particulate), landing site materials (earth
minerals), Orbiter Thermal Protection System (tile, RTV and
glass insulation), paints and primer from various sources. An
interesting finding was the repeated occurrence of glass fiber
from structural insulation (ref STS-50 vertical stabilizer
sample). A blue paint/zinc alloy particulate combination was
also noted and is discussed as a new finding. There was no
apparent vehicle damage related to these residuals.
STS-58 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
The results of the STS-58 organic analysis are included in this
report (ref Figure 20). Identified materials included those
associated with window covers (plastic polymers), RTV from RCS
thruster nozzle cover adhesive and paint from various sources.
The analysis of the blue particulate revealed an alkyd base
paint of unknown origin.
STS-51 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
The final results of the STS-51 organic analysis are also shown
in this report (ref Figure 20). Identified materials included
those associated with window covers (plastic polymers), RTV
from RCS protective cover adhesive, and paint from various
sources. No new findings were associated with this analysis.
NEW FINDINGS
This set of post-flight debris residual samples led to one new
finding, which was obtained from 'the Orbiter window samples.
Blue paint of an alkyd base with zinc alloy on one side of the
particulate was discovered. Although the precise source has not
yet been determined, the blue paint does not appear to be
related to any debris damage.
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Ii.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, 11 post
launch anomalies, including four In-Flight Anomalies, were
observed on the STS-58 mission.
11.1 LAUNCH PAD/SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY
i. Two debris particles fell out of a cavity in the HDP #3
doghouse blast cover during liftoff.
2. The GH2 vent line did not immediately latch, but drifted
back toward the vehicle approximately 12 inches before finally
latching within the envelope of the intertank access structure.
There was no excessive slack in the static retract lanyard.
Post launch inspection found the GH2 vent line latched on the
second tooth of the latching mechanism.
11.2 EXTERNAL TANK
i. ice on the GUCP legs caused two pieces of intertank CPR
foam to pull loose from adjacent stringer heads and expose
primer/substrate. The two pieces of intertank foam (10"x2" on
the +Z side; 3"x2" on the -Z side) adhered to the ice on the
GUCP legs during disconnect and retraction. The large piece of
foam eventually fell between the LH SRB and the External Tank.
2. Foam, 28 inches long by 3 inches wide, was missing from a
stringer head forward of the bipods and aft of the +Z aero vent
(XT-990) . At least 18 inches of primer was exposed. The loss of
this foam may have contributed to the centerline tile damage on
the Orbiter lower surface (IFA STS-58-T-I) .
3. Both bipod jack pad closeouts were missing. Primer was
visible in 25 percent of the +Y jack pad cavity and 50 percent
of the -Y jack pad cavity. The loss of this foam may have
contributed to the centerline tile damage on the Orbiter lower
surface (IFA STS-58-T-1) .
4. The lightning contact strip across the forward section of
the L02 ET/ORB umbilical had detached completely and was later
observed tumbling near the ET cross beam. It drifted aft slowly
until lost from the field of view (IFA STS-58-V-0010) .
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Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Summary
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" '- Lockheed
ENGINEERINGAND SCIENCEPROGRAM
2400 NASA Road 1, P. O. Box 58561, Houston, Texas 77258-8561 (713) 333-5411
December 1, 1993
Greg Katnik
MC/TV-MSD-22
OSB Room 5203R
KSC, Florida 32899
Dear Greg,
The following STS-58 Summary of Significant Events report is from the Johnson Space
Center NSTS Photographic and Television Analysis Project, and was completed December 1,
1993. If you have any questions or comments please contact Christine Dailey/483-5336 of
the NSTS Photographic and Television Analysis Project.
Sincerely,
PhotoPI'V Analysis Project
cc: Job order file
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1.0 Mission Summary
STS-58 was the longest duration shuttle mission since the inception of the program. The
orbit inclination angle for this mission was 28.45 degrees and the initial orbit altitude was
153 nautical miles. The primary cargo in the payload bay was the Spacelab Life
Sciences-2 (SLS-2) module. The primary middeck payload was the Shuttle Amateur
Radio Experiment-II (SAREX-II). The crew on this mission consisted of: commander
John Blaha, pilot Richard Searfoss, payload commander Rhea Seddon, payload specialist
Martin Fettman and mission specialists Shannon Lucid, David Wolf and William
McArthur.
1.1 Launch
The launch of Columbia (OV-102) for STS-58 occurred from Pad B at 14:53:10.019
UTC on October 18, 1993 (day 291) as seen on camera E-9. Solid rocket booster (SRB)
separation occurred at 14:55:13.735 UTC as seen on camera E-204.
Two events seen on films were declared inflight anomalies (IFS's). The debris seen at 45
seconds MET is believed to have come from the dome mounted heat shield damage
found after landing (IFA STS58-V-09). A missing lightning contact strip on the ET LO2
umbilical seen on the umbilical well film was declared an inflight anomaly (STS58-V-
10).
Detailed Test Objective-312, photography of the external tank after separation, was
performed this mission using Orbiter umbilical well cameras and a handheld Nikon
camera. Thirty-eight frames of the external tank were acquired by the astronauts.
The lower left booster separation motor (BSM) aero heat shield cover was missing on the
RSRB at the time of recovery. Post-recovery analysis of the booster rockets at Kennedy
Space Center indicated that the cover was probably lost at the time of water impact.
1.2 On Orbit
No significant events were tracked on orbit.
1.3 Landing
STS-58 concluded with the landing on runway 22 at Edwards Air Force Base on Monday,
November 1, 1993 (day 305). All of the landing sequence times were obtained from
DTV-1. The right main gear touched down at 15:05:41.909 UTC and the left main gear
touched down at 15:05:41.942 UTC. Nose wheel touchdown occurred at 15:05:53.087
UTC and wheel stop was at approximately 15:06:43.504 UTC.
No major anomalies were noted in any of the approach, landing and rollout video views.
During the post-landing walkdown, the following items were noted: damage was
observed to the SSME #3 dome mounted heat shield (DMHS) at the nine o'clock
position; the SSME #2 DMHS was lifted away from the surface at the three o'clock
position; a large portion of one tile appeared to be missing from the upper surface of the
body flap (in addition to several other small nicks); a divot was seen just beneath the
forward starboard reaction control system ports; a white, putty-like substance (probably
seal material) was noted on the LH2 umbilical outer rim; and thermal protection system
damage was visible on both the left and right nose gear doors.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events
2.1.2 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition
2.1.2.1 Dark Debris from RSRB HDP M-2 DCS
(Camera E-8)
Two small pieces of dark debris fell from the right SRB HDP M-2 DCS stud hole at liftoff.
objects did not appear to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
The
Figure 2.1.2.1 Debris falls from RSRB HDP M-2 DCS
A small piece of dark debris can be seen falling along the front of the RSRB aft skirt just after
liftoff. This debris was one of two pieces seen exiting the DCS stud hole. Neither of the pieces
appeared to strike the vehicle.
2.1.2.2 Debris from GH2 Vent Arm Carrier Plate
(Cameras E-31, E-33 and E-50)
Two small patches of intertank spray on foam insulation (SOFI) were stripped away from both
sides of the ET intertank GH2 umbilical during the ground umbilical carrier platc (GUCP)
retraction seen on Camera E-31. The bare metal substructure did not appear to be exposed. One
of these pieces of debris was also seen on Camera E-50. The debris did not appear to strikc thc
vehicle.
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events
Figure 2.1.2.2 Stripped Foam Insulation on ET GH2 lntcrtank Area
Two pieces of foam insulation were stripped away, one on each side, flom both sides of the GH2
intertank umbilical. This picture shows the vent arm pulling away at liftoff. Note that no bare
metal is exposed on the ET.
2.1.2.3 Debris from above ET/Orbiter Bipod Area
(Camera E-65)
At least two very small, light-colored pieces of debris, first seen behind the LO2 feedline above
the bipod, fell aft at liftoff. The debris did not appear to strike the vehicle.
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2,0 Summary of Significant Events
2.1.2.4 SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7)
(Cameras E-l, E-7, E-9, E-12, E-13, E-15, E-16 and E-57)
As on previous missions, several pieces of debris were noted originating from the SRB flame
duct area after SRB ignition. None of the flame duct debris was seen to strike the vehicle.
A fast moving rectangular piece of debris was seen exiting the LSRB flame duct at
approximately 0.179 seconds MET on camera E-13. The debris moved up and then to the south,
but did not appear to strike the vehicle. The size of the debris was approximately 2.9 sq. inches.
(The 2" scale marker on the SRB was used for scale.) The three-dimensional velocity of this
debris was calculated. The velocity of the debris in the image plane was generated by finding the
distances in the x and y dimensions that the debris moved from its initial position. Because the
scale changed as the debris moved closer to the camera, a new scale was applied for each
position. The velocity in the direction of the camera (along the camera's optical axis ) was
determined by using the known size of the debris when it was near a 2" scale marker on the SRB
and its subsequent apparent change in size as it moved closer to the camera. This variance in
scale was then correlated with the change in distance using the formula: distance = focal
length/scale. A 2nd order polynomial regression curve was then fit to the distance vs. time data
in each dimension and the first derivative was used to find the velocities as a function of time.
The maximum debris velocity was found to be approximately 58 feet/second which occurred at
about 0.27 seconds MET.
A fast moving piece of debris was seen exiting the RSRB flame duct at approximately 1.7
seconds MET on cameras E-1 (see Figure 2.1.2.4) and E-57. The debris moved to the northwest
and appeared to break into two pieces at approximately 1.716 seconds MET. The size of the
debris could not be accurately determined because it was blurred and partially obscured by the
SRB exhaust plume. The velocity of the debris in the image plane was found by finding the
distances in the x and y dimensions that the debris moved from its initial position and applying a
constant scale. (The width of the RSRB was used for scale.) A 2nd order polynomial regression
curve was then fit to the distance vs. time data in each of the dimensions and the first derivative
was used to find the velocities as a function of time. The maximum two-dimensional velocity
was found to be approximately 152 feet/second using data from camera E-1 at about 1.7 seconds
MET. The maximum 2-D velocity using data from camera E-57 was found to be only 60
feet/second which occurred at approximately 1.722 seconds MET. This large discrepancy
between calculated debris velocities stems from the fact that a large component of the velocity
vector using camera E-57 was in the direction of the camera and was not measured. (Since
camera E-57 is on the perimeter northwest of the PAD the velocity discrepancy is also consistent
with the movement of the debris to the northwest.)
A true three-dimensional velocity measurement for the debris seen on cameras E1 and E-57
using a phototheodolite solution was begun and will be completed as a general task.
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Figure 2.1.2.4 Debris from SRB Flame Duct at Liftoff
A fast-moving piece of dark debris was seen exiting the flame duct just after liftoff. The debris
appeared to break into two pieces as it moved toward the northwest and away from the vehicle.
The velocity of this debris is being calculated through the use of a multiple camera
phototheodolite solution. The results of this analysis will be reported in a general task.
2.1.3 Debris after Liftoff
2.1.3.1 Large White Debris near SSMEs at 45 seconds MET(Task #13)
(Cameras E-208, E-212, E-220, E-222, ET-204, ET-208, ET-212 and
KTV-4B)
A single large piece of white debris, first seen between SSMEs #1 and #3, fell aft into thc SSME
plumes at 45.192 seconds MET. KSC personnel postulated that this debris might be the DMHS
sacrificial panel. Measurements off the film indicated that the debris was about 14 by 15 inches
when sighted near the SSMEs. See Figure 2.1.3. l(a). As the debris passed by the SSME #3
nozzle, a small flare was seen in the plume. The same debris was measured as 26 x I 1 inches
when seen further aft in the SSME plume (Figure 2.1.3. l(b)). A tra.jcctory plot generated from a
sequence of frames showed that the object originated from between SSME #1 and #3 (Figure
2.1.3. l(c)). Post-landing views of the aft end of the Orbiter sccm to support the view that thc
debris originated from the SSME #3 DMHS. See Figure 2.1.3. l(d).
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Figure 2.1.3.1(a) and (b) Debris in SSME Phune at 45 Seconds MI':T
A large piece of white debris, firsl observed belween SSM[:,s #1 and #3, fell afl along the SSME
plume.
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Figure 2.1.3. l(c) and (d) Analysis of Debris in SSME Plume at 45 Seconds Mt'71
A trajectory analysis concluded that the white debris originated from between SSMI:,_, #1 and #3
(c). Post-landing inspection of the vehicle revealed considerable damage to the SSMI'_ #3 I)Mll,',;
at the nine o'clock position (d).
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2.1.3.2 Light-Colored Debris at 70 Seconds MET
(Cameras E-220 and E-222)
Multiple pieces of light colored debris fell aft from the SRB exhaust plume at approximately 70
seconds MET. See Figure 2.1.3.2. No further analysis of this debris is expected.
Figure 2.1.3.2 Debris near SRB Plume at 70 Seconds MET
Two pieces of light-colored debris can be seen falling aft of the vehicle and along the SRB plume
at 70 seconds MET. These are representative of the multiple pieces of debris seen during this
time period. None of the debris appeared to strike the vehicle.
2.1.3.3 Large Orange Debris seen just prior to SRB Separation
(Camera E-208)
A single large piece of orange debris traveled away from the SRB exhaust plume just prior to
SRB separation. (See Figure 2.1.3.3). The debris source could not be idcntified from the only
available view. Since one of the forward RSRB BSM covers was missing at the time of SRB
recovery, there was some speculation that this event may have been related. However, a later
KSC report indicated that the cover came off at water impact. No further analysis is anticipatcd.
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Figure 2.1.3.3 Large Orange Debris seen at SRB Separation
A single large piece of orange debris fell away from the SRB plume just before SRB separation.
A debris source could not be identified. The object did not appear to strike the vehicle.
2.1.3.4 Debris Reported by Crew (Task #10)
The commander reported that no unusual debris was visible flom windows W I, W2 or W3
during launch and ascent.
2.2 MLP Events
2.2.1 Discoloration of RCS Cover
(Camera E-18)
A slight discoloration of the L4D RCS cover was noted prior to liftoff. Similar paper
discoloration was seen on STS-43 and STS-56.
2.2.2 Orange Vapor (Possible Free-Burning Hydrogen)
(Cameras E-30, E-36 and OTV-163)
Orange vapor (possible free-burning hydrogen) was visible below the body flap at SSMI'_ startup.
This event is monitored to verify that the vapor does not carry up toward the ET/Orbitcr
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umbilicals (which might present a potential hazard). The vapor seen on this mission remained
well below the umbilical area.
2.2.3 Rippling of the SSME #2 DMHS at SSME Startup
(Came ra E- 18)
Rippling of the DMHS on SSME #2 was noted at SSME startup. A narrow white line at the
junction of the base of SSME #2 and the DMHS appeared intermittently. See Figures 2.2.3(a)
and (b). KSC was consulted and they believed that the line indicated a slight flexing or brief
unfolding of the DMHS blanket. A follow-up analysis of the same view from STS-51 did not
reveal similar movement. This information has been passed on to both KSC and the MER.
Figure 2.2.3(a) and (b) Rippling of the SSME #2 DMHS
These pictures show the rippling of the SSME #2 DMHS. Note the appearance of the white line
in (b). This rippling continued intermittently from about T-3.355 seconds to T-3.193 seconds.
STS-58 Final Reporl 113
2.0 Summary of Significant Events
2.2.4 Flashes in SSME #3 Plume after SSME Ignition
(Cameras E-2, E-3 and E-19)
Three flashes were noted in the SSME #3 plume at T-1.660 seconds, T-0.862 seconds and T-
0.791 seconds. Flashes in the SSME exhaust plumes have been seen on fourteen missions since
reflight. No follow-up analysis was requested.
2.2.5 Base Heat Shield Erosion
(Cameras E-18, E-I 9 and E-20)
Slight base heat shield erosion was noted near the -Y edge of SSME #2 during SSME startup.
See Figure 2.2.5. TPS erosion was also noted at the base of both the right and left RCS stingers
prior to liftoff. Some TPS erosion of the base heat shield has been seen on nearly all missions.
No further analysis is expected.
!
J
Figure 2.2.5 TPS Erosion at the Base of the Right R('S Stinger
A small amount of TPS erosion can be seen at the base of the right RCS stinger just before
liftoff. Minor base heat shield erosion has been seen on other missions and is not considered
anomalous.
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2.3 Ascent Events
2.3. I Discoloration in SSME #3 at 35 Seconds MET
(Cameras E-213, E-220, E-222)
A white discoloration in the SSME #3 plume was visible at 35.083 seconds MET. Discoloration
in the SSME plumes during ascent has previously been seen on STS-32. Discolorations in the
SSME plumes before liftoff has been noted on STS-43, STS-48 and STS-46.
Figure 2.3.1 Discoloration in tile SSME Pltunc At 35 Seconds MET
A white discoloration was seen in SSME plume #3 at 35.083 seconds MET. No further analysis
is anticipated.
STS-58 Final Report 1 1.5
2.0 Summary of Significant Events
2.3.2 Large Flare in SSME #1 at 46 Seconds MET
(Cameras E-212, E-213, E-220, E-222)
A large bright flare was noted in the SSME #1 plume at 46.218 seconds MET. The event
occurred about one second after the large white piece of debris was seen near the SSME plumes.
Thirteen other small flares were visible during early ascent. No further analysis is expected.
Figure 2.3.2 Large Flare in SSME Plume at 46 Seconds MET
A large bright flare that lasted for less than one-fiftieth of a second was seen in the SSME #1
plume. While flares in the plume are not usually considered abnormal, the size and brightness of
this particular event warranted closer study.
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2.3.3 Body Flap Motion (Task #4)
(Cameras E-207, E-212 and E-222)
Slight body flap motion was noted during the time of maximum dynamic pressure (between 30
and 90 seconds MET). The magnitude of motion seen on this mission was not sufficient to
warrant further analysis.
2.3.4 Linear Optical Distortions
(Cameras E-208, E-212, ET-208 and KTV-13)
At least five linear optical distortions were observed during ascent at 57.251, 60.357, 64.401,
69.873 and 71.008 seconds MET. Johnson Space Center engineers previously correlated this
event with the propagation of shock waves through the atmosphere. No further analysis is
anticipated.
2.3.5 Recirculation (Task #1)
(Cameras E-204 and ET-204)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV prior to SRB separation
was seen on nearly all previous missions. The sighting of this event is dependent upon launch
inclination angle and cloud cover during ascent. For STS-58, the start of recirculation was
observed at about 92 seconds MET and the end was noted at approximately 102 seconds MET on
camera E-204. A compilation of recirculation start and stop times for all missions since reflight
has been updated.
Cameras on which recirculation was observed for STS-58
CAMERA START (seconds MET) STOP (seconds MET)
ET-204 93 100
*E-204 92 102
* BEST VIEW OF RECIRCULATION
2.4 On Orbit
2.4.1 Analysis of Onboard Photography of the ET {DTO-312} (Task #6)
Thirty-eight photographs were analyzed from the STS-58 mission. The exposure was
good for all frames and the focus was variable. Representative images are shown in
Figures 2.4.1 (a) and (b).
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Figure 2.4. l(a) and (b) Handheld Camera Views of ET after Separation
Two apparent divots were noted on the LH2 tank-to-intertank interface on these photographs.
These divots were linearly scaled from photographs STS-58-02-04 and STS-58-02-36. The divol
observed in frame 4 measured 8 inches (arrow 1) and the divot noted on frame 36 measured 16
inches.
The separation velocity was calculated by determining the distance to the O,bite, on four
photographs. The photographs had tinring information. Separation velocity was determined by
calculating the slope of the distance versus time line fiom the photographs. Sep:m_licm velocity
was calculated to be 5.7 meters per second.
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ET/Orbiter Separation Velocity
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Figure 2.4.1 (c) Graph Showing Orbiter/ET Separation as Function of Time
This graph shows the distance from the Orbiter to the ET as a function of time. The sequence of
images used to produce this plot was acquired over a period of about four minutes. Note the
linear correlation indicating a constant separation velocity.
2.4.2 Umbilical Well Camera Analysis (Task #5)
2.4.2.1 16 mm Umbilical Well Camera Views of SRB and ET Separation
Two 16 mm motion picture films (one with a 5 mm lens and one with a 10 mm lens) were
acquired from the Orbiter LH2 umbilical cameras. The 16 mm motion picture films showed
LSRB and ET separation along with the normal venting and debris associated with these events.
The exposure and focus of the umbilical well films were good, however, the 16 mm with the
5 mm lens is degraded by the back lighting from the sun during the ET separation sequence. No
timing data is available from OV-102.
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Figure 2.4.2. l(a) t6 mm Camera with 5 mm Lens View of the LSRB at Separation
The LSRB separation appeared normal. Multiple pieces of light colored TPS debris of various
shapes and sizes are visible before, during, and after the separation of the SRB (i). Chipping and
erosion of the TPS on the base of the -Y electric cable tray (2) and the aft ET/Orbitcr and
ET/LSRB attach struts (3) are visible. The TPS on the -Y side of the LH2 umbilic,ll has a
blistered appearance(4).
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Figure 2.4.2.1(b) 16 mm Camera with 10 mm Lens View of the ET LH2 Umbilical
A large horseshoe-shaped piece of white debris (frozen hydrogen) was seen in front of the LH2
umbilical after ET separation (1). This debris may have come from the flapper valve at the
orifice of the LH2 17 inch line (2). A linear shaped piece of material was seen coming from near
the cross beam between the LH2 and LO2 umbilicals (3). This debris has a thin edge and is light
on one side and dark on the other. The movement is from the general direction of the LO2
umbilical. This debris might be the missing lightning contact strip from the LO2 umbilical (see
Section 2.4.2.2 on the 35 mm umbilical well camera film analysis). A thin rectangular piece of
debris was seen coming from behind the LH2 electrical cable tray prior to the separation of the
external tank. A small dark piece of debris was seen just to the left of the IA 12 electrical cable
tray.
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Figure 2.4.2. l(c) and (d) Comparison of the ET LH2 Umbilical (On Orbit View) and the
Orbiter LH2 Umbilical (Post-Landing Inspection View)
A white substance (probably RTV) was seen on the lower rim of the ET LH2 umbilical (1) near
the 4 inch disconnect. A picture taken by the debris team after the Orbiter landing indicated that
loose material was present on the lower rim of the Orbiter LH2 umbilical near the four inch line
disconnect (2).
STS-58 Final Reporl
122
2.0 Summary of Significant Events
Figure 2.4.2.1 (e) Debris falling along ET after separation
A piece of debris, light on one side, dark on the other, was seen tumbling af! in front of the
hydrogen tank well after ET separation (1).
Pieces of white debris continued to move across the field of view until the end of tile 16 mm
films. The ET had a slight lean to the right by the end of the fihns. Multiple pieces orwhite
debris (frozen hydrogen) and white vapors were in view throughout the El" separation scqtLencc.
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2.4.2.2 35 mm Umbilical Well Camera Views of ET Separation
Sixty well exposed and focused 35 mm frames were obtained of the external tank separation.
The images are degraded slightly by what appears to be a smt,dge or smear on the camera
window.
Figure 2.4.2.2(a) 35 mm Camera View of the ET LO2 Umbilical
The lightning contact strip across the forward portion of the LO2 umbilical appeared to be
missing (1). TPS scarring was seen on the right side of the LO2 umbilical at the vertical section
of the electric cable tray (2). A loose piece of material (insulation) was scen at the upper right
corner of the LO2 umbilical (3). Missing or loose material (insulation) was seen at the upper left
corner of the LO2 umbilical (4). TPS scarring was seen on tile forward end of the +Y thrust strut
(5). Chipping of the TPS on the aft LO2 feedline support bracket was noted (6). A thin white
(frost appearing) line was visible on the aft LO2 feedline bcllows (7). Small TPS blemishes were
seen on the LH2 tank acreage forward of the cross beam near the LO2 umbilical (8). A dark
circular mark was seen on the TPS of the aft portion of the LO2 feedline (9). A similar but less
distinctive mark was visible at the same location on the pre-launch photography.
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Figure 2.4.2.2(b) 35 mm View of Bipod and LH2 Tank/Intertank Region ol FT
A linear white mark was seen on a intertank stringer (with dark substratc material visible in the
center of the white mark)just below the +Z vent (1). The white mark was measured to be 29.1
inches long and 4.6 inches wide. The dark center of the mark measured 26 inches in length. A
divot was seen on the intertank and the LH2 tank-to-intertank closeout flange in the -Y direction
from the forward bipod (2). This divot was measured to be 19.7 inches in the longest dimension
and 6 inches in width. Two white marks were seen under the forward bipod legs on the LH2
tank-to-intertank flange. These white marks may be missing bipod jackpad close-outs (3). Four
small apparent divots were seen on the intertank TPS forward of the forward ET/Orbiter attach
bipod (4).
STS-58 Final Report ].25
2.0 Summary of Significant Events
2.5 Landing Events
2.5.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3)
Landing sink rates are calculated from both film and video sources when available. On this
mission, the best video view for generating sink rates was DTV- 1 ; the best film views were
seen from E-1002 and E-1008. In general, sink rates calculated from film are considerably
more accurate than those obtained from video. However, the video results serve as a sanity
check.
2.5.1.1 Sink Rate from Video
(Camera DTV-1)
Camera TV- 1 was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. Scalar information was
determined by a system of equations which took into account the orientation of the camera
relative to the Orbiter. Data was gathered approximately 1 second prior to landing through
touchdown at a rate of 30.0 frames per second. The equations were solved for each observation
which took into account the change in perspective as well as change in size. The distance
between the center of the main gear and a reference point was computed and a linear regression
was applied on this normalized vertical distance versus time data to find the actual sink rate.
This rate was determined to be 2.0 feet per second.
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*Note. These heights are with respect to a reference point NOT the runway.
Camera TV- 1 was used to determine the sink rate of the nose gear. Scalar information was
determined by a system of equations which took into account the orientation of the camera
relative to the Orbiter. Data was gathered approximately 1 second prior to landing through
touchdown at a rate of 30.0 frames per second. The equations were solved for each observation
which took into account the change in perspective as well as change in size. The distance
between the center of the nose gear and the main gear was computed and a linear regression was
applied on this normalized vertical distance versus time data to find the actual sink rate. This
rate was determined to be 3.3 feet per second.
STS-58 Final Report 126
2.0 Summary of Significant Events
perspective as well as change in size. The distance between the center of the nose gear and the
main gear was computed and a linear regression was applied on this normalized vertical distance
versus time data to find the actual sink rate. This rate was determined to be 2.9 feet per second.
Film Nose Gear Height vs. Time
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2.5.2 Drag Chute Performance(Task #9)
(Camera DTV-I, DTV-2, DTV-3 and DTV-4)
The landing of Columbia at the end of mission STS-58 marked the tenth deployment of
the Orbiter drag chute. All components of the drag chute appeared to deploy as expected.
The following event times were obtained from camera DTV- 1 except for drag chute
initiation which was acquired from DTV-4:
Drag chute initiation
Pilot chute inflation
Bag release
Drag chute inflation
in reefed position
Drag chute inflation in
disreefed configuration
Drag chute release
15:05:51.299 UTC
15:05:52.386 UTC
15:05:53.053 UTC
15:05:54.488 UTC
15:05:58.025 UTC
15:06:24.518 UTC
Standard analysis of the drag chute angles as a function of time was performed using views from
film camera E-1008. This analysis is used to support the improvement of the aerodynamic math
models currently in use. During the first twenty seconds of deployment, the maximum
horizontal chute deflection was approximately 4.34 degrees.
2.6 Other Normal Events
Other normal events observed include: FSS deluge water; ice buildup on the SSME vent
nozzles; ice debris and vapor from the ET/Mission umbilical disconnects at SSME startup
through liftoff; slight vapor from the gaseous oxygen (GOX) vent on the ET, flashes in the
SSME plume prior to liftoff; slight motion of the body flap between SSME ignition and liftoff;
base heat shield erosion during SSME startup; water leak from MLP j-pipes; ice and vapor from
the GUCP during SSME startup and arm retraction; ice and vapor from both Tail Service Mast
(TSM) umbilicals at liftoff; debris in the exhaust cloud at the pad after liftoff; RCS paper debris
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Camera data received at MSFC
for STS-58
MLP
FSS
Perimeter
Tracking
Onboard
16mm 35mm 70mm Video
22 0 0 3
7 0 0 3
3 3 0 6
0 15 0 11
4 2 0 0
Totals 36 20 0 23
Total number of cameras received at MSFC 79
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is
provided as Appendix B. Appendix C contains detailed
assessments of the video products received at MSFC.
a. Ground Camera Coverage:
Photographic coverage of STS-58 was considered good.
Tracking coverage was limited due to cloud cover. Camera E-205
was not received because there was total cloud coverage at this
site and the vehicle was not visible.
b. Onboard Camera Assessment:
A camera was flown on each SRB forward skirt to record the
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly. The
astronauts carried a 35mm hand-held camera to record film for
evaluating the ET TPS integrity after ET separation. Thirty-
eight frames of the ET after separation were received and
reviewed. Two 16mm motion picture cameras and one 35mm still
camera were flown on this mission in the orbiter's umbilical
well to record the SRB and ET separation.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
a. General Observations:
While viewing the film, several events were noted which
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and
falling as the vehicle lifts off; debris induced streaks in the
SSME plume; ice falling from the 17" disconnects and umbilicals;
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f. Slag from SRB Plume:
Figure 7 is a film frame from camera E-222 showing solid
material exiting from the SRM plume. Twelve pieces of slag were
observed exiting the plume between T+64 seconds and T+69
seconds.
g. ET divots
There was one large divot located on the intertank forward
of the bipod and aft of the +Z aero vent. The size of this
divot was estimated to be 24" x 3". The leading edge of this
divot was measured to be at station 970 and -i degree from the
+Z axis. Figure 8 is a film frame from the 35mm umbilical well
camera showing this divot. Also visible in figure 8 are three
divots on the scarf joint in the bipod area. Figure 9 is
another film frame from the 35mm umbilical well camera showing
several small divots along the LH2 +Z tank acreage.
Several debris impacts greater than 1 inch were observed
on the orbiter's belly after landing. The location of the large
ET intertank divot was mapped onto the orbiter debris map as
shown in figure I0.
V. ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times are determined from cameras which view the
SRB holddown posts numbers M-l, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras
record the explosive bolt combustion products.
POST CAMERA POSITION TIME (UTC)
M-I E-9
M-2 E-8
M-5 E-12
M-6 E-13
291:14:53:10.019
291:14:53:10.017
291:14:53:10.018
291:14:53:10.018
b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined
to be approximately 30 inches. Figure ii is a data plot showing
the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and
vertical directions. These data were derived from camera
E-79. Camera E-79 exhibited significant image jitter during
operation.
c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-56 was determined to be
291:14:55:13.69 UTC as recorded by camera E-207.
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Figure i.
Loose ET Instafoam at GUCP During Retraction
Figure 2.
Frangible Nut Material Falling from Holddown Post M-3
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Figure 3.
Debris Falling from Boattail Region
Figure 4.
Large Flash in SSME Plume
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Figure 7.
Material Exiting SRM Plume
Figure 8.
Large TPS Divot on ET Intertank
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Figure 9.
Several Small TPS Divots on LH2 Tank Acreage
Figure I0.
Orbiter Belly Debris Map with ET Intertank Divot Location
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Space Systems Division
Rockwell International Corporation
12214 Lakewood Boulevard
Downey, California 90241
Rockwell
International
December I, 1993 In Reply Refer to 93MA3669
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058
Attention: L. G. Williams (WA)
Contract NAS9-18500, System Integration, Transmittal of the Rockwell
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for the STS-58 (Scrub 1, Scrub 2)
and STS-58 Mission
The System Integration contractor hereby submits the Engineering
Photographic Analysis Summary Report in accordance with the Space Shuttle
Program Launch and Landing Photographic Engineering Evaluation
Document (NSTS 08244).
The first and second launch attempts of STS-58 on October 14 and 15, 1993
were scrubbed and no films were received for these launch attempts.
The third launch attempt of the STS-58 mission was successful and occurred
on October 18, 1993.
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been
evaluated to determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and
video) providing this coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39B Fixed
Service Structure (FSS), Mobile Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter
sites, and uprange and downrange tracking sites for the STS-58 launch
conducted on October 18, 1993, at 7:53 a.m. PDT/GMT 291:14:53:10.009 from
the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and for the landing on November 1, 1993 at
Edwards Air Force Base at 7:06 a.m. PST/GMT 305:15:05:42.
Rockwell received launch films from 81 cameras (57 cine, 24 video) and
landing films from 17 cameras (10 cine, 7 video) to support the STS-58
photographic evaluation effort. Film E-205 was unavailable due to a camera
malfunction.
(Packing Sheet No. DM93-19910)
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During the post landing debris inspection of STS-58 (OV-102, Columbia) at
the Edwards Air Force Base/Ames-Dryden Flight Research Center it was
reported that a forty inch section of the DMHS closeout blanket was
missing from the 9 o'clock position of SSME #3 exposing the inner blanket
layer. The outer layer of the DMHS at the 3 o'clock position on SSME #2
was detached on three sides. All of the remaining DMHS blankets were in
nominal condition. Analysis results will be documented in the KSC
Ice/DebrisfrPS Assessment and Integrated Photographic Analysis Report
(NASA Technical Memorandum). No further action is planned at
RI/Downey.
On cameras OTV-009, E-30, E-34, and E-65, multiple pieces of white debris
(probably umbilical ice) were seen falling from the LH 2 and IX) 2 ET/
Orbiter umbilical disconnect area at SSME ignition. Several of these
particles contacted the LH2 umbilical sill, but no damage was detected. No
follow-up analysis is planned.
On camera E-8 two pieces of ordnance debris was seen falling from the
right SRB HDP M-2 DCS/stud hole during liftoff. No follow-up action is
planned.
Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen ) was seen below the body
flap at SSME startup on cameras OTV-163, E-30 and E-36. This vapor
appears to be similar to the vapor noted on previous missions. It is not an
issue and no follow-up action is planned.
A dark piece ofdebris(probablyfacilityrelated)was seen fallingalong the
leftsideofthe vehiclepriorto liftoffoncameras E-34 and E-35. This may
be the same debrisseen on camera E-31 entering the fieldofview and
passing near the outboard elevon. Also,on camera E-31 a second piece of
debriswas seen fallingbetween the Orbiter and the ET forward ofthe
ET/Orbiter umbilicalsat liftoff.No follow-upactionisplanned.
On Cameras E-31, E-33 and E-50 two small pieces of intertank spray on
foam insulation (SOFI) were stripped away on either side of the ET GH2
umbilical connection during the ground umbilical carrier plate (GUCP)
retraction. One piece of foam fell between the left SRB and the ET and did
not appear to contact the vehicle. No follow-up action is planned.
On cameras E-2, E-3 and E-19 three flashes were noted in the SSME #3
plume before liftoff. Flashes in the SSME exhaust plumes have been seen
on previous missions. No follow-up action has been requested.
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A qualitative assessment has been conducted and positive clearances
between the left SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The
films showed nominal launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies
were observed for the SRB body trajectory.
11. Cameras E7-16 and E27-E28-OMRSD File IX Vol.5, Requirement
No. DV08P.020 requires an analysis of film data of SRM nozzle during
liftoff to verify nozzle to holddown post drift clearance.
A qualitative assessment of the launch films has been completed. No
anomalies were observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive
clearances between the SRB nozzles and the holddown posts were verified.
12. The landing of STS-58 occurred on the hard surface runway 22 at Edwards
Air Force Base. Good video and film coverage was obtained and no
anomalous events were observed. This flight marked the eleventh use of the
Orbiter drag chute. The drag parachute system performed as expected. All
sequenced events occurred as expected and no hardware anomalies were
observed.
This letter is of particular interest to Messers W. J. Gaylor (VF2) and C.F. Martin
(MK-SIO-2) at NASA/JSC and NASA/KSC respectively. The Integration Contractor
contact is R. Ramon at (310) 922-3679.
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL
Space Systems Division
_'_Chief Engineer
System Integration
RPJcl
CO: G. J. Della Longa, BC4, NASA]JSC, Houston, Tx
W. J. Gaylor, VF2, NASA]JSC, Houston Tx
H. S. Brown, MK-SIO-2, NASA/KSC, Kennedy Space Center, Fl
D. Pitts, SN15, NASA]JSC, Houston, Tx
G. Katnik, TV-MSD-22, NASA/KSC, Kennedy Space Center, FI
B. Hoover, BICO-1, NASA/KSC, Kennedy Space Center, FI
T. Rieckhoff, EP55, NASA/MSFC, Huntsville, Al
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NASA]JSC Mail Center
(Complete external distribution made via Data Management Systems)
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